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I. INTRODUCTION
Picture a typical law student in her Professional Responsibility course, learning
the American Bar Association’s various frameworks for client confidentiality and
candor toward a tribunal. If she is like most law students, she would easily agree
with the precept that a lawyer must keep her client’s confidences; she would like the
sense of trust that confidentiality builds between lawyer and client. As class
instruction turns to the rules on candor to a court, the law student’s internal moral
compass would surely lead her to agree that a lawyer must tell the truth to a judge.
Her relative lack of experience with people in legal trouble could bring her a
somewhat unsettled feeling at the realization that a desperate client might perjure
himself to achieve exoneration. Her discomfort would probably grow to a sense of
unbalance once she learns that model rules require a lawyer to tell on her client once
*
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the lawyer comprehends that the client has perjured or will perjure himself. And that
sense of unbalance would undoubtedly develop into outright cognitive dissonance if
she realizes that every model ethics guide promulgated by the ABA places a lawyer
in the position of violating either the rule of confidentiality or the rule of candor in
the service of fulfilling the other.
At that point, the law student might assume that her conclusion simply must be
inaccurate and that the nation’s legal experts have provided some concrete steps for
lawyers to take in the highly charged situation when a client’s interests in
confidentiality clash with the interests of justice. After all, the current rule on candor
toward a tribunal tells a lawyer that when she confronts a perjury situation, she must
take “reasonable remedial measures.”1 Surely, those “measures” provide the steps,
the path, for the lawyer to take to resolve the conflict—and resolve it in an ethical
manner. Sadly, any law student who immerses herself in the study of professional
ethics must draw the conclusion that those “measures” provide neither path nor safe
harbor. At this stage of realization, the law student likely closes her ethics casebook
and silently hopes that she never finds herself in that situation. But then she passes
the bar, becomes a practicing lawyer, represents a lying client, and suffers the full
force of her dismay: she has no way out of this ethical dilemma. And now it’s a real
situation, not an academic exercise. With no way out, she is likely to face
professional discipline for any step she takes because that step will conflict with
some other ethical or constitutional mandate. This forced false choice deprives the
lawyer of due process.
The ABA’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 mandates “reasonable
remedial measures” for lawyers who have to navigate the competing mandates of
client confidentiality and honesty to a court.2 Unacceptably, the Model Rules do not
define what measures would be both reasonable and remedial. The non-binding
commentary following Rule 3.3 does spell out several steps for a lawyer to take:
remonstrate with the client, withdraw from representation, disclose the perjury to the
court.3 Unfortunately for the lawyer in the bind, these steps almost always prove to
be ineffective, unavailable, and hopelessly contradictory. This witches’ brew
deprives the lawyer of due process when her inability to satisfy judge and bar
counsel results in court-imposed sanctions or professional discipline.
Analyzing the inherent conflict posed by the use of an undefined mandate—
“reasonable remedial measures”—leads to analysis of the even deeper, unresolvable
conflicts in the primary steps prescribed by commentary: the client’s narration of his
own story, the lawyer’s withdrawal from representation, and the lawyer’s disclosure
of the client’s false evidence. Not all of the reasonable remedial measures protect
both the client’s confidentiality and the court’s insistence on honesty, and none of
them protects the lawyer from charges of impropriety. In the face of the utter failure
of the Model Rules to accomplish their conflicting goals, the ABA’s rules drafters
should start over from the beginning with a clear-eyed view of which one goal is
most important to them. They do not have to stay with the current failed regime.
They could, instead, provide direct and defined rules that people of reasonable
1

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983) (amended 2002).

2

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983) (amended 2002).

3

MODEL RULES
added).

OF

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002) (emphasis
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intelligence can understand and fulfill. Doing so is, at this point, the only way by
which the ABA can maintain any credibility in its leadership position in the realm of
legal ethics.
II. CONFLICTS IN “REASONABLE REMEDIAL MEASURES”
What is a lawyer to do when he discovers that his client has committed perjury or
is about to? From the very first days of lawyer regulation, the various versions of
the legal ethics codes have contemplated some sort of action by a lawyer to rectify a
client’s fraud or perjury. The actions—whether mandated or merely suggested—
have spawned a cottage industry of interpreters because no agreement exists on what
the rules mean.4
The 1908 aspirational Canons of Professional Ethics stated:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced,
which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he should endeavor
to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if his client refuses to
forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should promptly inform the
injured person or his counsel, so that [he] may take appropriate steps.5
Sixty-five years later, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility directed that:
[a] lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that . . . [h]is
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same,
and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to
the affected person or tribunal.6
This mandatory rule, as opposed to the Canons’ aspirational goal, first requires
the lawyer to ask—“call upon”—his client to correct the perjury. If the client
refuses, the lawyer must disclose the fraud. The unqualified disclosure requirement
seems to have been unintended by the drafters, for five years later, the ABA
amended this disciplinary rule to read that the lawyer “shall reveal the fraud to the
affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged
4

See generally Nathan M. Crystal, False Testimony by Criminal Defendants: Still
Unanswered Ethical and Constitutional Questions, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1529 (2003); Steven
H. Goldberg, Heaven Help the Lawyer for a Civil Liar, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 885 (1989);
Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55
BROOK. L. REV. 485 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Client Fraud Problem as a Justinian
Quartet: An Extended Analysis, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1041 (1997); Peter J. Henning, Lawyers,
Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209
(2006); Norman Lefstein, Client Perjury in Criminal Cases: Still in Search of an Answer, 1
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521 (1987); J. Kevin Quinn, Nancy K. Kubasek & M. Neil Browne,
Resisting the Individualistic Flavor of Opposition to Model Rule 3.3, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
901 (1995); George Rutherglen, Dilemmas and Disclosures: A Comment on Client Perjury, 19
AM. J. CRIM. L. 267 (1992); Joseph P. Williams, Client Perjury and the Duty of Candor, 6
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1005 (1993).
5

CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 41 (1908).

6

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969) (amended 1974).
What constitutes a “privileged communication” under the Model Code has also been a source
of confusion to lawyers. See infra Part C.1.
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communication.”7 After that amendment, the disciplinary rule seemed to require
disclosure only when the lawyer’s knowledge of the perjury came from information
that was not protected as a client confidence or secret—a rare occurrence.8
By 1983, the drafters of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct tried to capture
this idea of a lawyer’s response to client perjury in a term of art: “[i]f a lawyer has
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures.”9 Although phrased in the past tense (“has offered”),
the rule made no express distinction between past and future fraud on a court,10 but
commentators and courts treated the term as covering both.11
The original version of the Model Rules, published in 1983, nowhere defined
“reasonable remedial measures,” revealing, perhaps, the drafters’ belief that the
phrase was a term of art, already understood by the relevant judicial players.
Drafting the rules on the mistaken assumption of such an understanding, or taking
easy way out by leaving the interpretation to courts and commentators, was an
abdication of the drafters’ responsibilities to lawyers, lawyers’ clients, and the judges
before whom they appeared.12 Rather than do the hard work of defining the term, the
drafters deferred to Rule 3.3’s comments to illuminate the phrase—entirely new to
the bar with the Model Rules—and succeeded only in casting darkness where they
should have been shedding light. The non-binding, supplementary commentary
following the rules was unorganized, intellectually sloppy, tentative, and internally
contradictory. Here are some highlights:
•

7

Comment 5 theorizes that upon learning that “material” evidence was
false, “the lawyer should seek to persuade [his] client that the evidence
should not be offered;” if the evidence had already been offered, the
lawyer should seek to persuade the client to come clean with the court.13
If persuasion were ineffective, “the lawyer must take reasonable
remedial measures.”14 Until the final sentence, the guiding commentary

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1974).

8

Some commentators have concluded that once it was amended this way, the Model
Code “hardly ever” requires the lawyer to disclose the perjury to the court. See, e.g., Charles
W. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 820 (1978). But see infra Part C.1.
9

MODEL RULES
added).
10

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (1983) (amended 2002) (emphasis

OF

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983) (amended 2002).

11

See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 38 (Ct. App. 1999) (conflating
remediation of past perjury with prevention of future perjury by including narration among
other reasonable remedial measures); ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3, Legal
Background (1996); Mary C. Daly, Identifying and Resolving Ethical Problems that Arise in
Trying Commercial Cases, 502 PLI/LIT 185 (1994); David D. Dodge, When Your Client
Wants to Lie: How to Protect Yourself, Your Client and the Judicial System, 35 ARIZ. ATT’Y
12, 34-36 (1998).
12

See generally Wolfram, supra note 8.

13

MODEL RULES
added).
14

MODEL RULES
added).

OF

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 5 (1983) (amended 2002) (emphasis

OF

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 5 (1983) (amended 2002) (emphasis
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is aspirational only.15 When the comment does become directive, it uses
the term to define the term, a lazy technique that the drafters also
employ in other parts of the ethics codes.16
•

Comment 6 claims that the “generally recognized” rule is that if
disclosure to the court is necessary to rectify the fraud, then the lawyer
“must” disclose the fraud—except in the defense of a criminal
defendant.17 But six paragraphs later, Comment 12 gives the reader
whiplash when it states that the general disclosure rule does apply to
defense counsel in criminal cases.18 The quick change of heart may
have revealed the drafters’ fear of exempting a large portion of the bar
from the rule’s reach, a simple proofreading error, or a genuine lack of
understanding of what they were trying to require.

•

Comment 11 officially addresses the term “remedial measures,”
establishing an unofficial behavioral landscape for managing client
perjury: the “proper course” “ordinarily” is to remonstrate with the
client confidentially. If that fails to produce rectifying results, the
lawyer “should” seek to withdraw. “If withdrawal [would] not remedy
the situation or is impossible, the [lawyer] should” disclose the perjury
to the court.19 Of course, the comment’s moral imperative of “should”20
creates the appearance that withdrawal and disclosure are choices for
the lawyer, not mandates, but this language proves a trap even for the
wary.

Together with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA publishes the
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a volume that collects case
annotations of the rules and extended commentary on their meaning. The authors of
this annotated volume congratulated the drafters on resolving the Model Code’s
ambiguity regarding the action required when a lawyer learns that he has offered
false evidence.21 These writers are the only ones who could have believed that
congratulations were in order. No one actually operating under a version of these
rules could have thought so. The years between 1983 and 2000 witnessed an
outpouring of analysis and criticism of the Model Rules on confidentiality and

15

“Should” indicates a moral imperative. See WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
778 (1949).
16
See generally Susan E. Thrower, How Can I Confuse Thee? Let Me Count the Ways:
An Argument for a Due Process-Based Reality in the Ethics Rules Governing Lawyer
Confidentiality and Candor, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 329 (2010).
17

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 6 (1983) (amended 2002).

18

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 12 (1983) (amended 2002).

19

MODEL RULES
added).

OF

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002) (emphasis

20

See generally Thrower, supra note 16.

21

See ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3, Model Code Comparison (1996).
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candor and on their labyrinthine and internally inconsistent language.22 The claimed
impetus behind the Ethics 2000, a wholesale review of the 1983 Model Rules, was to
address some of this criticism.23 The project was a failure from this perspective.
Unlike the 1983 version, the 2002 Model Rules expressly differentiated between past
perjury and prospective perjury and prescribed “reasonable remedial measures” for
both.24 Under new Rule 3.3(a)(1), “a lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make any false
statement of fact”—the rule dropped 1983’s qualifier “material,” surely an
improvement25—but he must now correct a previous false statement of “material”
fact—qualifier undefined.26 Neither the rule nor its explanatory commentary
provided a rationale for this differentiation between past and future falsity.
The undefined “material” makes another appearance in Rule 3.3(a)(3) in setting
up the reasonable remedial measures principle: the rule applies if the lawyer learns
that he, his client, or his witness has offered false “material evidence.”27 Further
obfuscating the ethical picture, this rule injected yet another degree of uncertainty
into the lawyer’s deliberations of whether to disclose the falsity with the undefined
qualification of, “if necessary”: “the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures,
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”28
This concept of necessity had made its way from the 1983 version’s Comment 6
into the 2002 rule language. The migration of language from a non-binding
comment to a binding rule should have been a normative good for purposes of
statutory interpretation, but in this case, the drafters succeeded in increasing, not
decreasing, uncertainty. Although the new rule itself does not state what the
disclosure would be “necessary” for, the 1983 and 2002 comments imply that the
necessity is to rectify the situation of a court being misled by false evidence.29
Utterly opaque is how the lawyer is to determine if disclosure is, indeed,
“necessary.” The rest of the rule is a blank on this point. Perhaps the witness’s lie is
so patent that the judge sees through it at once and needs no warning. But if the
lawyer does not know of the judge’s awareness and employs the necessity rule to
disclose the falsity, he violates his duty of client confidentiality and opens himself to
professional discipline.
22
See generally Goldberg, supra note 4; Hazard, supra note 4; Quinn, Kubasek &
Browne, supra note 4.
23

See, e.g., Crystal, supra note 4, at 1531-50 (presenting various problems and omissions
of 1983 Rules and showing attempts at clarification in 2002 version).
24

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) & R. 3.3 cmts. 6 & 10 (2002); see also
Daniel Walfish, Making Lawyers Responsible for the Truth: The Influence of Marvin
Frankel’s Proposal for Reforming the Adversary System, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 613, 635-36
(2005).
25

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2002) (emphasis added).

26

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2002); see Walfish, supra note 24, at
635-36 & nn.129, 133.
27

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002).

28

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002) (emphasis added); see also
Walfish, supra note 24, at 636 & n.131.
29

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 6 (1983) (amended 2002); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002).
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This is a result unworthy of the drafters because it was foreshadowed by cases
interpreting the Model Code and so could have been avoided during the drafting of
the Model Rules. In Butler v. United States,30 a criminal defendant changed his story
and, in doing so, caused his lawyer to believe that he would commit perjury if
allowed to testify.31 The lawyer’s remonstrations with his client were having no
effect, so during an in camera meeting, the lawyer explained to the judge why he
could not put his client on the stand.32 The judge agreed wholeheartedly that the
lawyer’s participation in perjury would be a violation of his professional ethics.33
Upon the defendant’s conviction, the appeals court was especially hard on the judge
for not certifying the case to another judge once learning of the lawyer’s disbelief in
his client’s case.34 It also criticized the lawyer for unnecessarily betraying his
client’s confidences to the judge, implying that the betrayal constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel and led to the deprivation of the client’s due process.35 The
appeals judge strongly sided with the duty of confidentiality, but both the lawyer and
trial judge had thought that the merits of the dilemma were with the duty of
honesty.36 The formal capture of the “if necessary” caveat to the 2002 Model Rule
3.3 is predictably playing out in courts with Butler-like confusion.
Although the 2002 version still provides no definition of “reasonable remedial
measures” in either the Terminology section or within the body of Rule 3.3, its
Comment 10 did become a bit more expansive in explaining those steps that a
lawyer is to take upon having offered “material” perjurious evidence. This comment
spells out a routine for the lawyer to follow when the lawyer “knows” that the client
or witness has perjured himself—either on direct examination or cross-examination
or at a deposition.37 The fact that the rule itself actually identifies none of these
litigation activities creates yet another ambiguity.38 But forging ahead, now the
“proper” course for a lawyer is to (1) remonstrate confidentially; (2) advise the client
of the lawyer’s duty of candor; and (3) seek the client’s cooperation with respect to
withdrawal or correction of the falsity. If that fails to prompt the client to come
clean, the lawyer must go further: (4) seek withdrawal; and (5) if withdrawal is
refused or will not undo the effect of the falsity, disclose the fraud as is “reasonably
necessary” to remedy the fraud, even if the disclosure will reveal confidential
information.39
30

Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1980).

31

Id. at 845.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 852-53.

35

Id. at 851.

36

Id. at 845. See also infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.

37

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002).

38

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).

39

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002). But see Monroe H.
Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 1939, 1953 (1988). Professor Freedman, famously opposed to any sort of disclosure,
argued that if remonstration fails and withdrawal is not an option, “the lawyer must present
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The “proper course,” though appearing to be detailed, still suffers from the flaw
of ambiguity. For both committed and prospective perjury, the actual rule language
mandates the lawyer: he “shall” take reasonable remedial measures.40
Confoundingly, the non-binding comments amplifying the rule equivocate,
mandating that a lawyer take reasonable remedial measures for past falsity,41 but
merely encouraging measures for prospective perjury: the lawyer “should” seek to
persuade the client to refrain from committing it.42 The rules say “shall,” but the
comments mix “should,” “must,” and “may.”43 The comments come back together
once the lawyer’s measures have failed to rectify the fraud, telling the lawyer that he
“must” disclose the perjury to the court.44
Remonstrate, withdraw, disclose: boiled down to their essentials, this is what the
Rule 3.3 comments advise for the lawyer facing client perjury.45 Beyond their nonbinding nature, the real measure of the comments’ impotence in guiding lawyers is
their porous language: “proper” course, not mandatory course;46 “ordinarily,” not
always;47 “should” seek to withdraw, not must seek to withdraw;48 “should” disclose
perjury, not must disclose perjury;49 “must disclose” as “is reasonably necessary”;50
“must refuse” to offer false evidence,51 but “should” resolve doubts in the client’s

the client’s testimony in the ordinary way and remain true to the lawyer’s pledge of
confidentiality.” Id.
40

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).

41

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002).

42

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 6 (2002) (“If . . . the client intends . . . ,
the lawyer should . . . .”).
43

Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmts. 1-11 (2002).

44

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (1983) (amended 2002); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002).
45
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmts. 7 & 11 (1983) (amended 2002); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002); see also Wolfram, supra note 8, at 846-66.
Professor Wolfram synthesized the steps of remonstration into five elements: (1) the lawyer
should advise his client that perjury is a crime; (2) the lawyer should advise his client of the
risks that he faces by testifying falsely or by promptly rectifying his perjury; (3) the lawyer
should urge the client to testify truthfully or to disclose fully the true facts when he has
already committed perjury; (4) the lawyer should inform his client that failure to follow his
advice would force the lawyer to withdraw from the representation; and (5) in jurisdictions
that require disclosure, the lawyer should tell his client that he will have to reveal his client’s
perjury. Id. at 846-47.
46

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002).

47

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002).

48

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002). The actual
rule language omits any mention of a reasonableness standard for the necessity principle.
49

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002).

50

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002).

51

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 6 (2002).
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favor, yet “cannot” ignore “obvious” falsehoods.52 The entire scheme is a rat’s nest.
With such conflicting duties to follow, lawyers and commentators must question the
drafters’ intent to be effective at prescribing the expected behavior. What is a lawyer
to do when he finds himself in one of the non-“ordinary” situations? How is a
lawyer even to perceive that he is in one of those non-ordinary situations? The
comments are silent.
This open question followed the similar gaping hole created when the ABA’s
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility carelessly tossed off
this dicta in a formal opinion construing the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility: “The tradition [of exempting client confidences, and not just
information protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, from disclosure in
cases of client perjury] . . . is so important that it should take precedence, in all but
the most serious cases, over the duty [of disclosure of perjury].”53 The Committee
made no further effort to illuminate what those “most serious cases” might be. At
the end of that opinion, the Committee announced that its interpretation of the rule to
preserve confidential information from disclosure “minimizes the problems” of
lawyers with lying clients,54 giving no heed to the lawyers who would fall through
the cracks due to the rules drafters’ faulty thinking and writing. Apparently, some
undeserved lawyer discipline is acceptable to them.
The language of the ABA’s rules, comments, and interpretive opinions is simply
not designed to do the one job that it has: to tell those governed, “Do this, and you
will fulfill your duty; disobey this, and you will violate your duty.” Noting similar
interpretive problems with Model Rule 1.6 on confidentiality, one scholar expressed
a similar sentiment:
Model Rule 1.6(b), within its context of the entire Model Rules, does not
preclude a lawyer from inferentially revealing client confidences to
protect victims of a client’s continuing or planned fraud. On the other
hand, there is a potentially strong argument that the profession would be
better served by relying less on a collateral rule to modify and limit
inferentially the specific language of the very rule that is designed to
address the disclosure question. For this reason . . . the profession might
well give serious consideration to the development of a revised rule that
says what it means, means what it says . . . .55
Another question the drafters left unaddressed is how quickly after discovering
perjury or fraud a lawyer must begin the reasonable remedial measures. While Rule
3.3 and Comment 13 set the conclusion of the proceeding as an outside limit on the
duration of the duty to remediate,56 the drafters provide no starting gun by which a
lawyer is to launch the measures. The Supreme Court of Idaho suspended a
52

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2002).

53

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) (emphasis
added).
54

Id.

55

Harris Weinstein, Client Confidences and the Rules of Professional Responsibility: Too
Little Consensus and Too Much Confusion, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 727, 739 (1994).
56

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) & R. 3.3 cmt. 13 (1983) (amended 2002);
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) & R. 3.3 cmt. 13 (2002).
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prosecutor thirty days for not beginning measures fast enough.57 The prosecutor had
not been paying attention to a witness’ specific testimony because he was reading his
notes, preparing for his next questions, when the witness lied.58 The prosecutor
learned of the witness’ false testimony only when a fellow prosecutor alerted him to
it later that day.59 He visited the witness right after learning of the problem and
prepared to call him to the stand the next day to correct the falsity, but by then, the
defense lawyer had learned of the perjury, and the judge had declared a mistrial.60
The disciplinary board ruled that the lawyer should have invoked reasonable
remedial measures at the moment the witness told the lie.61 As the lawyer was
unaware of the existence of the falsity when it occurred, he could never have
satisfied this standard. In the absence of any rule on this timing issue, lawyers
apparently must act immediately, even when they are unaware of a problem.62 Only
in two jurisdictions must those subject to rule act in the absence of knowledge:
Wonderland and the realm of legal ethics.63
The disparity between Rule 3.3 and its comments, and the absence of answers to
legitimate questions unanswered by the rules, are not mere academic abstractions.
The Scope section of the Model Rules states that the “[c]omments do not add
obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the
Rules.”64 When the comments—meant to provide lawyers with guidance—are
inconsistent with the rules or with each other, they fail to fulfill their purpose. Does
the mix of mandate and aspiration in the comments relating to potential perjury mean
that a lawyer could take some, but not all, of the measures—or different measures—
in seeking to persuade a client to refrain from perjuring himself and still satisfy the
rule’s mandatory language? A lawyer must find out on his own, for the rule drafters
have not seen fit to tell him. The drafters were either unable or unwilling to say
what they mean and mean what they say.65
A. Narration
Lawyers struggled with the 1969 Model Code’s absolute conflict between the
duties of revealing fraud but maintaining client confidential information. Some
sources of would-be guidance did appear along the way, but they were not much
57

See Idaho State Bar v. Warrick, 44 P.3d 1141 (Idaho 2002).

58

Id. at 1143, 1146-47.

59

Id. at 1147.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

But see Newcomb v. State, 651 P.2d 1176, 1177 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (finding
lawyer acted with “reasonable dispatch” in informing the trial court of defendant’s potential
perjury, even though “it would have been nicer” to have learned of potential ethical issue on
the same day the lawyer did; trial court recognized that lapse of one day permitted lawyer to
research his ethical duties).
63

“Sentence first, verdict afterwards.” LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES
WONDERLAND 187 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1898) (1865).
64

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Scope para. 14 (2002).

65

Cf. Weinstein, supra note 55, at 739.
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help. Identifying the peril that this conflict represented for criminal defense lawyers
in particular, a separate constituency in the ABA tried to fill the gap. In the early
1970s, members of the ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards for
Criminal Justice drafted the Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the
Defense Function.66 The Defense Function Standards were to serve as guidelines for
the criminal defense bar to follow when a criminal defendant announces the intent to
commit perjury. Standard 4-7.7 requires that the lawyer first remonstrate with his
client against lying.67 If remonstration is unsuccessful and trial has not started, the
lawyer may withdraw, if feasible.68 If the court will not permit withdrawal, the
lawyer “should” make a file record of the failure of his remonstrance “in some
appropriate manner without revealing the fact to the court.”69 At trial, the lawyer is
to confine his examination to identifying the client and permitting him to make a
statement to the finder of fact—no direct examination, no later arguing the client’s
version of the facts.70 The lawyer is not afterward to refer to or rely on known
perjury in his argument to the fact-finder, but he is not otherwise to reveal the falsity
of the client’s testimony.71
The authoring committee withdrew these suggested Standards before they came
before the ABA House of Delegates for consideration and adoption,72 but the
concept of permitting the criminal defendant to “make a statement” to the fact-finder
had some staying power, making its way into the 1983 Model Rule 3.3 comment 9.73
It appears to have been a compromise position along the way from the 1969 Model
66
See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
(1971); cf. People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 813-14 (Ct. App. 1998); STEPHEN GILLERS
& ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 258 (2007).
67

STANDARDS RELATING
Standard 4-7.7(a) (1971).

TO THE

PROSECUTION FUNCTION

AND THE

DEFENSE FUNCTION

68
See id.; see also Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813-14; GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 66,
at 258; Barry R. Vickrey, Tell It Only to the Judge: Disclosure of Client Confidences Under
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 60 N.D. L. REV. 261, 270 (1984). The
Defense Function Standards advise a lawyer not to give the judge the reason for the
withdrawal request. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 66, at 258; Wolfram, supra note 8, at
861.
69
STANDARDS RELATING
Standard 4-7.7(c) (1971).
70

TO THE

PROSECUTION FUNCTION

AND THE

DEFENSE FUNCTION

Id.

71

Id.; see Brent R. Appel, The Limited Impact of Nix v. Whiteside on Attorney-Client
Relations, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1921-22 (1988); Wolfram, supra note 8, at 826-27. A
more modern reader can see in these steps the shape of what would later become the Model
Rules’ reasonable remedial measures.
72

See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 66, at 259. The second edition of the ABA Standards
of Criminal Justice, published in 1979, omitted Standard 4-7.7. See ANN. MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. Utilizing the Narrative Approach when Client Intends Perjury
(1992).
73

“Three resolutions of this dilemma [of a lawyer’s participation in perjury] have been
proposed. One is to permit the accused to testify by a narrative without guidance through the
lawyer’s questioning.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 9 (1983) (amended
2002).
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Code’s single directive of disclosure to the court74 to the Model Rules’ more
stepped-progression “reasonable remedial measures.” The approach allows the
client to take the stand and freely narrate his story, without questioning by the
lawyer.75 The theory of the approach is that because the lawyer is not guiding the
client by questioning him, he is not “offering” evidence that he knows to be false.
The ABA has been particularly torn over the use of the “free narrative approach”
for the potentially perjuring criminal defendant. By the time the House of Delegates
had approved Model Rule 3.3 in 1983, the drafters had become nervous about the
practice of narration: comment 9 recognizes the existence of the approach76 and then
immediately rejects its use as a denigration of both the principles of confidentiality
and candor.77
Despite this 1983 rejection, courts quickly took to the practice. Federal and state
courts from Washington, D.C., to Alaska, from the mid-1970s past the turn of the
twenty-first century, adopted narration as a decent, if imperfect, solution to the
perjury dilemma.78 Accordingly, the commentary to the 2002 Model Rules retained
the recognition of the approach and acknowledged the practice among the nation’s
courts.79 Comment 7 noted that in a contest between a court mandate of narration
and Rule 3.3’s prohibition on knowingly offering false evidence, the lawyer’s
74

Before the 1974 amendment, no exception existed regarding disclosure of information
protected by the attorney-client privilege. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7102 (1969) (amended 1974).
75
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
Standard 4-7.7 (c) (1971); see also Appel, supra note 71, at 1921-22; Lefstein, supra note 4, at
541; Wolfram, supra note 8, at 826-27.
76

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 9 (1983) (amended 2002).

77

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 9 (1983) (amended 2002).

78

See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978); United States ex
rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977); Coleman v. State, 621 P.2d 869, 881
(Alaska 1980); People v. Guzman, 755 P.2d 917 (Cal. 1988) (holding use of narrative leading
to conviction did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel nor violation of client
confidentiality); People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 817 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating the
narrative approach represented best accommodation of competing interests of lawyer and
client); People v. Gadson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219, 226 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the lawyer’s
use of narrative was reasonable attempt to solve “a dilemma to which there was no clear
solution”); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C. 1976); Herbert v. United States,
340 A.2d 802 (D.C. 1975); Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(endorsing the narrative approach when criminal defendant demands to testify and lawyer
believes defendant will perjure himself); State v. Waggoner, 864 P.2d 162 (Idaho Ct. App.
1993); People v. Taggart, 599 N.E.2d 501 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (rejecting convicted defendant’s
claim of Sixth Amendment violation after trial judge ordered him to testify in narrative);
People v. Lowery, 366 N.E.2d 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); State v. Fosnight, 679 P.2d 174 (Kan.
1984); People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 2001); People v. Salquerro, 433 N.Y.S.2d
711 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Commonwealth v. Mascitti, 534 A.2d 524 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), rev’d,
546 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1988) (ordering criminal defendant to testify by narrative, judge sounded
rare note of concern for lawyer in confidence/perjury dilemma); In re Goodwin, 305 S.E.2d
578, 580 (S.C. 1983); State v. Layton, 432 S.E.2d 740, 755 (W. Va. 1993); see also Crystal,
supra note 4, at 1547-48.
79

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 7 (2002).
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obligation under the Rule must give way to the judge’s order.80 The ABA’s Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility likewise dismisses narration as
a method of insulating a lawyer from a charge of assisting a client’s perjury.81 This
stutter-step reveals the ABA’s own internal conflict with the principles that should
guide and govern lawyers facing possible perjury. Lawyers and courts have, not
surprisingly, mirrored that confusion and inconsistency.
Butler v. United States82 illustrates one such mess. The criminal defendant had
once told his lawyer that he had had a gun during the commission of the crime and
then later told his lawyer that he had not.83 The lawyer remonstrated with his client
unsuccessfully.84 When the lawyer urged his client to accept the prosecution’s plea
offer, the client then accused the lawyer of ineffective assistance of counsel.85 At
that point, the lawyer disclosed to the judge the merits of his client’s case and his
belief that his client would commit perjury, in defense of the ineffective assistance
claim.86 At the client’s insistence, the case went to trial, and the lawyer did not call
the client to testify, but he suggested to the judge that the judge let the client narrate
his story.87 Ultimately, the court did not make that offer to the client, and the client
did not testify.88
During the appeal of the conviction, the appeals court considered the client’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.89 The court concluded that the record did
not support the inference that the lawyer knew that his client was going to commit
perjury.90 At that point, the lawyer knew only that his client had made inconsistent
statements, not that he would perjure himself.91 The lawyer, the trial judge, and the
appeals court all came to different conclusions as to what should have happened.
According to the appeals court, the lawyer had unnecessarily betrayed his client’s
confidences to the trial judge.92 In turn, the trial judge should have certified the case
to another judge once he had learned of the defendant’s potential perjury.93 The
appeals court concluded that the cumulative effect of the lawyer’s actions deprived
80
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 7 (2002). This comment was unhelpful,
given that state bar counsel spared no pains in prosecuting lawyers for alleged violations of
the rules despite court orders to proceed in opposition to them. See infra Part II.B.
81

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987).

82

Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1980).

83

Id. at 845.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 845-46.

86

Id. at 848.

87

Id. at 847-48.

88

Id. at 848 n.6.

89

Id. at 848-50.

90

Id. at 850.

91

Id.

92

Id. at 851. See also supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.

93

Butler, 414 A.2d at 851.
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the defendant of due process.94 The Butler court thought that the lawyer, instead,
should have followed Defense Function Standard 4-7.7 and permitted his client to
testify in a narrative,95 despite the fact that no governing body had ever adopted the
Standards.
[T]he courts [that] have weighed the dilemma of a defense counsel, faced
with the unenviable position of representing a client whom he knows will
commit perjury, have approved (for jury trials at least) the recommended
accommodation of the ABA Standards[,] which meets both ethical
requirements of protecting clients’ confidences and refraining from
wrongdoing.96
The court iterated its conclusion from earlier cases that Standard 4-7.7 is meant to be
used when the lawyer knows—not merely suspects—that the defendant’s testimony
is false.
Other courts have rejected this stringent and largely unprovable knowledge
standard or simply have been unconcerned with the lawyer’s certainty before
invoking narration. In one Pennsylvania trial for child sexual abuse, the lawyers
participated in an in-chambers hearing, during which the defendant’s lawyer
informed the judge that he believed that the defendant intended to testify falsely.97
During prior plea negotiations, the defendant had authorized his lawyer to reveal
confidential communications that were in direct conflict with a claim of complete
innocence, but later, the defendant said that he planned to deny all sexual contact
with the victim.98 The court denied the lawyer’s motion to withdraw and informed
the defendant that he would have to testify by narrative, rather than by direct
examination.99 In admonishing the defendant against perjury and explaining the
process of narration, the trial judge sounded the single note of concern for a lawyer
in a perjury dilemma, telling the defendant that
I’m not going to require [the lawyer] to call you as a witness [because] he
can’t be sure . . . until you’ve testified whether you’re going to testify
truthfully or not . . . . But in order to protect [the lawyer], . . . you will
testify in a narrative form.100
The court’s unstated assumption—that the lawyer could prevent the criminal
defendant from taking the stand if the lawyer “knew” that he would commit
perjury—is undercut by the law, by all scholarship on the topic, and by common

94

Id. at 851-52.

95

Id. at 849-50.

96

Id. at 850.

97

Commonwealth v. Mascitti, 534 A.2d 524, 526 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), rev’d, 546 A.2d
619 (Pa. 1988).
98

Id. at 527.

99

Id. at 526.

100

Id. at 528 (emphasis omitted).
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sense: a lawyer can never know what a client will do, any more than one human
being can ever know what another human being will do on any subject.101
Following other jurisdictions,102 the appeals court concluded that the trial judge
had not abused his discretion in directing the defendant to testify in a narrative
format, rather than permitting the lawyer to withdraw and declaring a mistrial.103
Unlike the Butler court, the Mascitti court did not consider the adequacy of the
lawyer’s knowledge of potential perjury nor the steps he had or had not taken prior
to raising the issue with the trial judge.104 And that made sense because the lawyer
could not have known what his client would do.
Indeed, in People v. Johnson,105 the lawyer told the trial judge that he could not
call his client to the stand due to “an ethical conflict.”106 Without probing the
lawyer’s reasoning, the judge assumed that the lawyer was concerned about possible
perjury.107 Agreeing that preventing the defendant’s testimony would be the only
way to avoid perjury, the judge agreed with the lawyer’s approach, and the defendant
did not testify.108 Upon his conviction, the appeals court concluded that the trial
court’s approach had attempted an “impossible task”—determining whether the
defendant would, indeed, perjure himself.109 Perhaps in recognition of the futility of
ever knowing any future event, the Johnson court did not discuss the standard of
knowledge that a lawyer would have to have before communicating his concerns to
the trial judge. It favored narration because the danger of perjury is reduced by
cross-examination and impeachment.110 The court concluded that the narrative
approach represented the “best accommodation of the competing interests” of lawyer
and client111 and that the lower court should have used the method, rather than
barring the defendant from testifying entirely.112
101

Cf. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987) (holding explicitly that criminal defendant
has constitutional right to testify on own behalf); People v. Taggart, 599 N.E.2d 501, 521 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992) (allowing narration upon lawyer’s “good faith” determination of perjury);
Hazard, supra note 4, at 1051 (“[J]udges assume that an advocate can identify client
perjury.”); Thrower, supra note 16, at Part III.B; Wolfram, supra note 8, at 842 (“[A]n
attorney will rarely be in a position to determine confidently whether particular testimony is
perjurious.”). Putting lawyers in desperate straits, “many courts have shown little sympathy
for the argument that an attorney is powerless in the face of client perjury.” Id. at 837.
102

See, e.g., People v. Lowery, 366 N.E.2d 155, 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); State v. Fosnight,
679 P.2d 174, 180 (Kan. 1984); People v. Salquerro, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
103

Mascitti, 534 A.2d at 529.

104

Id. at n.1.

105

People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805 (Ct. App. 1998).

106

Id. at 806.

107

Id. at 810 n.6.

108

Id. at 807.

109

Id. at 818.

110

Id. at 817.

111

Id.

112

Id. at 817-19. Cf. Thrower, supra note 16, at Part III.B.
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This endorsement—twenty years into the Defense Function Standards—rested on
two obvious fallacies: (1) the ABA hates its own Standard 4-7.7, only grudgingly
acknowledging its existence and refusing multiple times to adopt it as an official
rule;113 and (2) a lawyer’s silent presence in the courtroom while his client perjures
himself can hardly be characterized as refraining from offering known false
evidence—the standards invoked by both the Model Code and the Model Rules. The
lawyer is there, listening to the client’s narration of a false story and not objecting or
correcting.114 The fact that the lawyer is not directing the client’s testimony with
questions does not remove his behavior from the clear language of the rule;115 rather,
the lawyer is passively aiding perjury by using the narrative approach. Neither
Model Rule 3.3, nor its sister Rule 1.2(d) on counseling and assisting a client,
differentiate between active and passive assistance.116 The reasonable remedial
measure of narration is a fiction: the sin of allowing a client to perjure himself
cannot be cured—from either an ethical or common sense perspective—by the
lawyer’s silence at counsel table and his later omission of the testimony from closing
argument.117 A lawyer who follows this approach—even when adopted by judges in
the state in which he practices—opens himself to an ethics prosecution, one that
appears would be endorsed by the United States Supreme Court. In its landmark Nix
v. Whiteside118 decision, in a long discussion of the range of acceptable conduct by a
criminal defense lawyer confronted with a potentially perjurious client, and
considering withdrawal and narration as options, the Court intoned that “in no sense”
can a lawyer “honorably be a party to or in any way give aid to presenting known
perjury.”119
113

See supra Part II.A.

114

But see Wolfram, supra note 8, at 854 (recommending lawyer use corrective questions
to rectify perjury).
115
But see Lefstein, supra note 4, at 522-36 (endorsing narrative approach, rejecting
withdrawal, and advising lawyers to refrain from “calling” client as witness or questioning
around perjurious matters).
116
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983) (amended 2002); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).

A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or
assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
117

See Appel, supra note 71, at 1922 (rejecting free narrative approach); Vickrey, supra
note 68, at 270 (stating that ABA Defense Function Standard 4-7.7 is “particularly misguided”
in addressing the situation in which withdrawal is not possible, striking “a compromise that
fails to achieve any of the proper objectives of the legal system”); Wolfram, supra note 8, at
851 (identifying contradiction between ABA-endorsed “free narrative” approach and
disciplinary cases prohibiting any cooperation in client perjury).
118

Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).

119

Id. at 171 (analyzing Sixth Amendment standards of effective assistance of counsel
necessary for federal habeas relief, set by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
Compare State v. Waggoner, 864 P.2d 162, 168 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (“By presenting his
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With narration off the table as a reliable remediation measure, lawyers were left
with three others to try: remonstration—essentially pleading with the client to tell the
truth—withdrawal, and disclosure of the perjury. Remonstration is always a safe bet
from a disciplinary perspective because the lawyer will not be in danger of violating
other ethics mandates by employing it. The problem with it is that it is often
ineffective, leaving the lawyer with withdrawal and disclosure as tactics to employ in
preventing perjury and its effects. Neither is a workable solution.
B. Confusion About Withdrawal
Aside from the overarching questions about reasonable remedial measures,
specific confusion underlies the rules on withdrawal from representation. Neither
Model Code Disciplinary Rule 7-102 nor Model Rule 3.3 mentions withdrawal as a
step that a lawyer must take upon discovering client fraud.120 As it has developed,
the withdrawal practice appears to be meant as a sort of release valve for the lawyer
with a lying client, but it only adds to the unnecessary cognitive dissonance of a
lawyer’s life already produced by the ABA’s legal ethics framework. Many scholars
have identified the theoretical and practical problems raised by the withdrawal
rules.121 One of the fundamental problems is that no ABA ethics rule has ever
required withdrawal as a response to client perjury, yet plenty of judges and
disciplinary panels behave as if they do. Perhaps this is because the ABA rules
drafters and commentators seem to believe so, as well.122
Withdrawal as a response to client perjury has its roots in a lawyer’s duty of
confidentiality. Canon 37—the original duty of confidentiality—announced that a
lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers that he cannot fulfill his
obligation to his client.123 Later rules would expressly mandate withdrawal, but until
then, lawyers could take no directive guidance from the merely aspirational canon.
The Canons included no glossary or interpretive comments to shed any light on what
the authors meant by “should”; indeed, it is a moral imperative only and carries no
mandate.124
The apparent mandate arrived in 1969 with the Model Code. Neither the Model
Code’s nor the later Model Rules’ duties of client confidentiality and candor to the
court anticipate a lawyer’s withdrawal on the basis of his inability to fulfill either
obligation. Both ethics systems, though, do capture an overriding duty of
withdrawal in separate rules: Model Code Disciplinary Rule 2-110 and Model Rule
client’s testimony in narrative form, counsel did not assist the perjury by his client.”), with
People v. Andrades, 828 N.E.2d 599, 604 n.3 (N.Y. 2005) (expressly rejecting narrative
approach as incompatible with lawyer’s obligation to reveal fraud to court).
120

See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1974); MODEL RULES
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).

OF

121
See, e.g., Crystal, supra note 4, at 1538-40; Monroe H. Freedman, Professional
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 1469, 1475-77 (1966); Goldberg, supra note 4, at 917; Lefstein, supra note 4, at 525-27;
Wolfram, supra note 8, at 855.
122

Cf., e.g., ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3, Legal Background (1983).

123

CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 37 (1908) (amended 1937).

124

See WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 778 (1949).
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1.16 both express rules governing mandatory and permissive withdrawal.125 Both
mandate withdrawal if continued employment causes the lawyer to violate another
disciplinary rule:
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if
required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment, and a lawyer
representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment, if
. . . [h]e knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result
in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.126
“[A] lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced,
shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result
in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law . . . .”127
The comments following Model Rule 3.3 advise a lawyer to seek to withdraw
from the representation of a client who insists on testifying falsely: “[i]f perjured
testimony or false evidence has been offered, . . . the advocate should seek to
withdraw if that will remedy the situation.”128 This 1983 comment retains the old
Canons’ suggestion that the lawyer should seek to withdraw—not that he must.129
The 2002 version is similarly vague: “the advocate’s proper course is to . . . seek the
client’s cooperation with respect to the withdrawal . . . .”130
These non-binding supplements to the Model Rules all treat withdrawal as if it
were the cure-all for a lawyer with a lying client. But the ABA’s efforts to prevent
or remediate perjury by removing the lawyer from the scene suffer from multiple
broad-spectrum failures. As do the rules on client confidentiality and candor toward
a tribunal, the statements on withdrawal conflict with other ethical principles and
with everyday legal practice.131
1. The Withdrawal Rules Are Internally Contradictory
One fatal conflict is that Model Code Disciplinary Rule 2-110 and Model Rule
1.16 are contradictory, both on their faces and as applied; thus, they are
unconstitutionally ambiguous.132 Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B)(2) requires withdrawal
if a lawyer “knows” that continued representation will result in a violation of a
“Disciplinary Rule,”133 but DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) permits withdrawal if the client
125
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1969) (amended 1974); MODEL
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1974); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16
(1983) (amended 2002); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2002).
126

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1974).

127

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (1983) (amended 2002).

128

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002).

129

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002).

130

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002).

131

For a discussion of the several ways that the rules on client confidentiality and candor
toward a tribunal conflict with each other and with other ethical and Constitutional principles,
see generally Thrower, supra note 16.
132

See id. at Part IV.

133

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1974). But see Wolfram,
supra note 8, at 832 (asserting that the Model Code does not mandate withdrawal when
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“seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct.”134 Comparably, Model Rule
1.16(a)(1) requires withdrawal if the representation “will result” in violation of
another Rule of Professional Conduct,135 but Rule 1.16(b) permits withdrawal if the
lawyer “reasonably believes” that the client’s course of action is “criminal or
fraudulent.”136
There’s more. The behavioral choice provided by Model Code DR 2-110(B) and
2-110(C) is dependent on verb tenses that have no meaningful difference. DR 2110(B)(2) mandates withdrawal if the lawyer “knows or it is obvious that his
continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.”137 DR 2110(C), on the other hand, permits withdrawal if the lawyer’s “continued
employment is likely to result in a violation of a Disciplinary Rule.”138
In parsing the ambiguities, the lawyer’s level of knowledge is a good place to
begin. The Model Code requires that a lawyer base his withdrawal on his ability to
predict the future: “will” versus “likely.” The Model Rule requires that a lawyer
make his withdrawal decision based on the level of his knowledge of his client’s bad
behavior—knowledge (“will”) versus reasonable belief. Both of these standards are
precursors to the impenetrable morass of Model Rule 3.3’s regime of mandating or
permitting a lawyer’s response to his client’s perjury based on his actual knowledge
versus his reasonable belief of the lies.139 As with Rule 3.3, Rule 1.16’s system of
mandatory and permissive withdrawal based on the lawyer’s ability to read tea
leaves is unworkable.140
Similarly, no meaningful difference exists between “will result” and “is likely to
result.” “Will” signifies future certainty or likelihood.141 “Likely” implies
probability,142 and, hence, also refers to the future. If a measurable difference
between the two exists, a mathematician—not a lawyer—would have to make the
call. Lawyers, not traditionally trained in the science of statistics, cannot justifiably
be held to pinpoint-level accuracy in discerning the difference between the two.
This false choice of action based on the lawyer’s level of knowledge is a pervasive
theme in modern ethics frameworks.143
lawyer is surprised by client perjury, despite conclusions drawn in several disciplinary
opinions).
134

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) (1974) (emphasis added).

135

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2002).

136

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(2) (2002).

137

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1974) (emphasis added).

138

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(2) (1974) (emphasis added).

139

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).

140

For more on the unworkability of Rule 3.3’s scheme, see generally Thrower, supra note

16.
141

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1968 (4th ed. 2000).

142

Id. at 1014.

143

See, e.g., Crystal, supra note 4, at Part I.B.1; Freedman, supra note 39, at 1940-46;
Goldberg, supra note 4, at Part II.B; Green, supra note 4; Lefstein, supra note 4, at Part II.C;
Thrower, supra note 16, at Part III.B; Wolfram, supra note 8, at Part V.A.
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Ambiguities also infect the governance of the lawyer’s response. The difference
in the lawyer’s withdrawal approach depends on the type of bad act by the client.
Because falsehoods are the subjects of Model Code Disciplinary Rule 7-102 and
Model Rule 3.3, a client’s perjury would violate a Disciplinary Rule and a Rule of
Professional Conduct and would, therefore, mandate the lawyer’s withdrawal under
DR 2-110(B) and Rule 1.16(a). Because perjury is a crime in every state in the
country,144 the lawyer’s withdrawal would merely be permitted—not mandated—
under DR 2-110(C) and Rule 1.16(b), which cover an “illegal course of conduct” and
a “criminal or fraudulent” course of conduct, respectively.145 So with regard to
perjury, the question of an ethics rule violation on the one hand and a criminal act on
the other is a distinction without a difference.
Because a client’s perjury is criminal conduct that constitutes an ethics violation
when known to the lawyer, this one act invokes two rules simultaneously.146 Given
that mandatory withdrawal is the sanctioned response to a violation of another ethics
rule,147 but permissive withdrawal is the sanctioned response to criminal or
fraudulent conduct,148 a lawyer could reasonably be expected to draw the conclusion
that withdrawal is either mandated or permitted under Rule 3.3 for client perjury.
Faced with two equally viable choices under the ethics rules, a lawyer should be able
to choose the permissive rule and decide not to withdraw, yet this analysis will lead
to trouble for him. It is more of the same unresolvable conflict that the rules present
between keeping a client’s confidence and being candid with the court.149
In re A.,150 decided under the Model Code, aptly represents the sheer injustice of
placing that burden on a lawyer. In that case, a son had committed welfare fraud in
handling his declining mother’s finances.151 After receiving payments on her behalf
and keeping them unlawfully, an attack of conscience led him to arrange to repay the
funds.152 His mother died before he could accomplish the reimbursement.153
144
Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987)
(“Although Rule 3.3(a)(2), unlike 3.3(a)(4), does not specifically refer to perjury or false
evidence, it would require an irrational reading of the language: ‘a criminal or fraudulent act
by the client,’ to exclude false testimony by the client. While broadly written to cover all
crimes or frauds a client may commit during the course of the proceeding, Rule 3.3(a)(2), in
the context of the whole of Rule 3.3, certainly includes perjury.”).
145
This dance between the levels of a lawyer’s knowledge and the concomitant level of his
requirement to act models the tease posed by other ethics rules on the lawyer’s knowledge and
reasonable belief. See Thrower, supra note 16.
146

From a purely practical perspective, the mandatory rule probably swallows the
permissive rule: the lawyer must withdraw when confronted by client perjury. Still, this is not
what the rules say.
147

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1969) (amended 1974);
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2002).
148

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) (1969) (amended 1974);
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(2) (2002).
149

See Thrower, supra note 16.

150

In re A., 554 P.2d 479 (Or. 1976).

151

Id. at 480.

152

Id.
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The son’s divorce case proceeded simultaneously, and the judge there asked the
son a question indicating that the judge did not realize that the mother had passed.154
When the son permitted the judge to keep his erroneous impression, the son’s lawyer
stayed silent.155 The lawyer rightly understood that his client would be subject to
prosecution for welfare fraud if he had corrected the judge’s misimpression.156 He
remained quiet to avoid revealing a confidence that would result in his client’s
exposure to prosecution, an outcome certainly “detrimental” to the client and
required to be kept confidential under Model Code Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B).157
Later, the lawyer urged his client to correct the judge’s misimpression that the
mother was still living, and the client refused; he did not want to be prosecuted for
welfare fraud.158
The first-level disciplinary trial committee in Oregon found that the lawyer had
violated his duty to reveal his client’s fraud to the court, but the prosecuting bar
counsel actually urged the review committee to find that the lawyer’s violation was a
failure to withdraw, not a failure to disclose.159 Because DR 7-102, the Model
Code’s candor rule, did not require withdrawal in the face of perjury, bar counsel
must have been relying on withdrawal rule DR 2-110(B)(2), though the opinion
gives no indication of the rule on which the trial committee rested its decision.160
In a fractured opinion recommending a public reprimand, the members of the
Oregon review committee revealed broad confusion over the duty to withdraw.161
Two members concluded that the lawyer had participated in his client’s intentional
misdirection of the court. Those members opined that, at a minimum, the lawyer
“should” have withdrawn from representation because he knew that the client had
misled the court, and the client confidentiality rule must yield to the candor rule.162
They offered no rule in support of their analysis.163
Another member of the review committee concurred in the lawyer’s reprimand,
finding that the lawyer had been duty-bound to insist that the client permit him to
correct the deception and, “failing that, to withdraw from the case.”164 This panel
member recognized that the lawyer had an ethical duty to not “blow the whistle” on
his client, but he was uncomfortable that the lawyer had not “immediately

153

Id.

154

Id. at 481.

155

Id. at 481-82.

156

Id. at 483-84.

157

Id. at 484.

158

Id. at 482-83.

159

Id.

160

Id.

161

See id. at 484-85.

162

Id. at 484.

163

See id.

164

Id.
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disassociate[d] himself from [the deception].”165 As did his concurring colleagues,
this member offered no rule in support of his analysis.166
Two other members of the committee dissented. They concluded that the
lawyer’s greater duty was not to the court but was to his client through the
maintenance of the confidential relationship and the unbridled advocacy of his
client’s interests.167 The dissenters drily noted that the lawyer “would have been
criticized by someone regardless of what he did.”168
On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court applied DR 2-110(B)(2), which requires
withdrawal if the lawyer “‘knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will
result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.’”169 The court seemed to think that the
only thing obvious about the lawyer’s situation was that he could not simultaneously
satisfy both confidentiality and candor rules. Given that Oregon’s version of the
candor rule did not require withdrawal upon the discovery of perjury, the court
concluded that “it certainly could not have been ‘obvious’ . . . that the [lawyer’s]
continued employment would violate a disciplinary rule, . . . [t]herefore, the accused
was not [r]equired to withdraw under DR2-110(B)(2).”170
The court dismissed the complaint,171 but by that point, the lawyer had had to
endure the expense, the professional embarrassment, and the trauma of a disciplinary
inquiry, hearing, and appeal. Lawyers are not clairvoyant. Rules that are
inscrutable, that force an instant choice on lawyers that disciplinary panelists and
judges cannot make with certainty after months of consideration, violate
fundamental principles of due process.172
2. The Model Rules’ Comments Conflict with Each Other and with the Rules
From whence does the ironclad idea of withdrawal upon perjury come? It comes
from the corona formed by the non-binding ABA Ethics Committee opinions and the
explanatory comments. This corona exposes another deep flaw in the Model Rules’
scheme: the allegedly explanatory comments exacerbate the confusion regarding
withdrawal and its aftermath. Supplied by the Model Rules drafters as non-binding
explanatory helpers, the comments are not the rules, but are meant to illustrate the
rules.173 Nowhere do the actual rules state that the comments may amplify a
lawyer’s obligations, and, yet, this is exactly what the comments trend toward.
Model Rule 3.3 Comment 11 (1983) and Model Rule 3.3 Comment 15 (2002)
identify withdrawal as among the reasonable remedial measures that a lawyer should

165

Id.

166

See id. DR 2-110(B) seems likely to have been on this committee member’s mind.

167

Id. at 484-85.

168

Id. at 485.

169

Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1974)).

170

Id. at 486.

171

Id. at 487.

172

Cf. Wolfram, supra note 8, at 845 (stating few cases in Oregon cast such an extreme
burden on lawyers, yet they are prosecuted anyway).
173

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Scope (2002).
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take in order to rectify client fraud. These comments conflict with the comments
following Rule 1.16 on withdrawal.174 Three examples reveal the depth of the flaw.
a. The Comments Toggle Between Mandate and Permission
Comment 15 to the 2002 Model Rule 3.3 advises that if a lawyer requests leave
to withdraw under Rule 1.16(b)’s permissive withdrawal rule regarding his client’s
“criminal or fraudulent” conduct, the lawyer “may” reveal information relating to the
representation “only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with” the duty of
candor.175 What does this language mean? “Compliance” with the duty of candor
implies a mandate and is at odds with the comment’s use of the permissive “may.”
What “extent” would be “reasonably necessary” to comply with the duty? Would a
revelation of information to comply with all of the reasonable remedial measures be
permitted, or would a lawyer have to carefully tailor his revelation to the “extent
reasonably necessary” to succeed only on his motion for withdrawal?176
Given that the revelation of confidential information is typically viewed by
courts, clients, and lawyers as an extreme step, why did the drafters choose to bury
this nugget in a comment meant to “explain[] and illustrate[] the meaning and
purpose of the [r]ule”?177 In dissenting from an ABA opinion on a related topic, one
member of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
bitterly predicted that “[b]y making mandatory what is at most permissive, the
opinion has thus given aid and comfort to those who would increase the exposure of
otherwise innocent lawyers to both disciplinary and civil penalties . . . .”178
b. The Comments Inadvertently Raise the Question of Whether Withdrawal Really Is
Required
Comment 10179 identifies withdrawal as one of the reasonable remedial measures
that a lawyer “shall” take upon discovering the use of false evidence, but Comment
15180 backtracks from the idea that withdrawal is obligated after a lawyer discloses
perjury.181 It notes, instead, that Rule 1.16(a) requires a lawyer to seek to withdraw
once he has complied with the duty of candor if that compliance causes his
relationship with his client to deteriorate.182 This implies that the lawyer could have
174
Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992)
(dissent) (noting Ethics Committee’s dysfunction in relying on unenforceable comment to
Model Rule 1.6 as support for its insistence on mandating “noisy withdrawal” in face of client
fraud, when text to Rule 1.6 mandates no such duty).
175

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 15 (2002).

176

See Crystal, supra note 4, at 1543.

177

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Scope para. 21 (2002); see Rutherglen, supra note
4, 267-68 (favoring withdrawal over disclosure, explaining that Rule 3.3 disclosure
compromises lawyer’s role as advocate).
178

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992) (dissent).

179

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002).

180

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 15 (2002).

181

See also Crystal, supra note 4, at 1539.

182

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 15 (2002); MODEL RULES
CONDUCT R. 1.16(a) (2002).
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complied with Rule 3.3 without withdrawing, the withdrawal becoming relevant only
if that compliance later destroys the attorney-client relationship. Accordingly, if the
drafters did not really consider withdrawal to be a required action, Comment 10’s
inclusion of it in a list of “remedial measures” that lawyers “shall take” causes
confusion and can lead to disciplinary scrutiny.183
c. The Comments Are Confused About Lawyer-Client Relations
Comment 15’s loose use of mandatory language is another problem for lawyers.
The comment states that the lawyer “may be required” by Rule 1.16(a) to seek
withdrawal upon the deterioration of the lawyer-client relationship,184 when Rule
1.16 mandates nothing of the sort. Rule 1.16 says withdrawal is mandatory only
upon (1) actions that result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law; (2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition that impairs his ability to
represent his client; or (3) the client’s discharge of the lawyer.185 All of the other
enumerated situations lead only to the lawyer’s permissive withdrawal, and the
disintegration of the attorney-client relationship is not among the reasons listed.186
3. The Rules Conflict with Actual Legal Practice
A final flaw demonstrating the failure of the rules governing withdrawal is the
infrequency of withdrawal as a factual matter. The ethics rules’ blithe treatment of
withdrawal as a lawyer’s sword or shield indicates that the rules drafters had little
practical experience with the issue in a real courtroom. While the comments to the
candor rule appear to accept withdrawal as a foregone conclusion,187 actual judges
are singularly unwilling to permit a lawyer to withdraw once a case has made it past
its initial stages.188 Rule 1.16 Comment 3 hints at some recognition of the
contradiction between the rule and reality: “[d]ifficulty [in obtaining court approval]
183
Scholars are divided on the issue of whether withdrawal in the face of perjury is even a
good idea. See, e.g., Lefstein, supra note 4, at 525-27, 549-50 (rejecting withdrawal as
solution to client perjury because it inevitably requires lawyer to disclose confidential
information in service of withdrawal request); Wolfram, supra note 8, at 854, 860-62
(recommending use of “corrective questions” during examination and recommending
withdrawal for civil action); see also In re A., 554 P.2d 479 (Or. 1976).
184

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 15 (2002).

185

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a) (2002).

186

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2002).

187

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmts. 10 & 15 (2002).

188

See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 8, at 860. Professor Wolfram’s investigation revealed
that judges permit withdrawal in criminal defense cases only if the trial has not yet begun. Id.
at 855; see also People v. Taggart, 599 N.E.2d 501 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (refusing lawyer’s
motion to withdraw but allowed lawyer to “disassociate” himself from defendant’s testimony
by ordering narration); Commonwealth v. Mascitti, 534 A.2d 524 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), rev’d,
546 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1988) (denying lawyer’s motion to withdraw from representation of
criminal defendant he believed would testify falsely); Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (denying lawyer’s motion to withdraw made before jury selection had
begun); State v. Trapp, 368 N.E.2d 1278, 1281-82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (holding trial court
erred in refusing to grant any of lawyer’s five motions to withdraw when his criminal defense
client insisted on presenting alibi based on perjury).
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may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client’s demand that the lawyer
engage in unprofessional conduct.”189 The rules drafters seem to have recognized
that lawyers do not come by withdrawal easily, and yet they made withdrawal the
focal point of the reasonable remedial measures, thus setting up a behavioral
framework that is destined to fail and lead to lawyer discipline.
A lawyer’s primary difficulty in gaining leave to withdraw is the uncertainty of
how much to tell the judge in order to persuade him of the merits of the withdrawal
request. What resources are available to a lawyer to guide him in clarifying this
uncertainty? Under the plain language of the 1974 version of the Model Code, a
lawyer may not disclose his client’s privileged communications, even to rectify fraud
on a court.190 It seems unlikely, then, that a Model Code jurisdiction would permit a
lawyer seeking to withdraw to reveal client confidences in the service of his
withdrawal explanation. The Model Rules, which do require disclosure of client
confidences in the case of perjury, place the heavy burden on the lawyer to assess
accurately when disclosure is “necessary” to that rectification or face discipline for
making the wrong call: if the lawyer knows that he is responsible for submitting
false evidence, he “shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary,
disclosure to the tribunal.”191 Jurisdictions that follow unadopted Defense Function
Standard 4-7.7192 may permit the lawyer to withdraw prior to trial, but the lawyer
may not tell the court why he is seeking to withdraw.193
Despite the Model Rules’ mandate of a lawyer’s disclosure of client confidences
to rectify perjury, a court will often deny a lawyer’s request to withdraw when his
reason is to avoid involvement with his client’s perjury: courts want to avoid the
appointment of another lawyer and the inevitable delay of the trial and, perhaps,
another withdrawal down the road when substitute counsel learns of his client’s
intended perjury.194 Accordingly, in order to dance on the head of this pin, a lawyer
must usually equivocate and tell the judge only that an “ethical problem” exists or
that “professional considerations” require termination, not that he suspects client
perjury.195 How often this undifferentiated excuse will convince a judge to permit
189
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 3 (1983) (amended 2002); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 3 (2002); see also Crystal, supra note 4, at 1539;
Rutherglen, supra note 4, at 269.
190

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1974); see also infra Part II.C.

191

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002); see infra Part II.C.

192

STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
Standard 4-7.7 (1971); see supra Part II.A.
193

STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
Standard 4-7.7(b) (1971); see Vickrey, supra note 68, at 270.

AND THE

DEFENSE FUNCTION

AND THE

DEFENSE FUNCTION

194
For a description of this withdrawal-appointment circle see Lefstein, supra note 4, at
525-26.
195

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 3 (2002); cf. United States v. Henkel,
799 F.2d 369, 370 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that lawyer moved to withdraw because he could
not “professionally . . . proceed”); People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 806-07 (Ct. App.
1998) (stating that lawyer explained he could not call client to stand due to “ethical conflict”);
People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981) (holding that request to withdraw should state
that lawyer had “irreconcilable conflict” with client and nothing more). But see Wolfram,
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the request is left to the reader’s skeptical consideration.196 And because Rule
1.16(c) comes down on the side of continued representation when the judge denies a
motion to withdraw,197 that denial places the lawyer in the position of having to
choose between following a court order—continue the representation—and
following a rule of professional responsibility—do not participate in client perjury;
he cannot fulfill both. This is the essence of unconstitutional ambiguity, a violation
of due process.198
Despite Rule 3.3 commentary’s identification of withdrawal as part of the
reasonable remedial measures that constitute a lawyer’s “proper course” upon his
discovery of client perjury, the rules and their comments are utterly divorced from
the realities of withdrawal in an actual courtroom.199 Perhaps understandably, judges
usually proceed in their courtrooms on the assumption that the ethics rules are
subordinate to their orders, often mandating that the lawyer put the client on the
stand or disclose confidential information, or refusing to permit the lawyer to
withdraw from representation.200 One scholar articulated the clear dilemma faced by
every criminal defense lawyer at some point in his career: if a judge directs a lawyer
to proceed with direct examination, the lawyer “will have to choose between obeying
supra note 8, at 863-66. Professor Crystal notes that other popular phrases such as “conflict
of interest” and “privileged reason” also function as tip-offs to a court that the lawyer’s client
plans to commit perjury. Crystal, supra note 4, at 1543.
196

See, e.g., Henkel, 799 F.2d at 370 (denying withdrawal when lawyer could not
“professionally . . . proceed”); Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806 (denying withdrawal when
lawyer explained he could not call client to stand due to “ethical conflict”); In re Decker, 606
N.E.2d 1094 (Ill. 1992) (ignoring lawyer’s motion to withdraw “due to professional and
personal ethics” and fielding several other motions and subpoena demanding privileged
information, ultimately leading to entry of contempt citation and order of imprisonment
against lawyer seeking to protect client confidences); People v. Taggart, 599 N.E.2d 501 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992) (ruling against lawyer’s motion for withdrawal based on “ethical
considerations”). In the same vein, providing no reason at all ensures denial of the lawyer’s
motion to withdraw. See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978). Professor
Lefstein argues that seeking withdrawal places the lawyer in a dangerous position because in
explaining why he wants to withdraw, the lawyer usually discloses confidential information.
Lefstein, supra note 4, at 549.
197

Model Rule 1.16(c) orders lawyers to “comply with applicable law requiring notice to
or permission of a [court] when terminating a representation.” It also mandates the lawyer to
continue his representation when a court denies his withdrawal request. MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2002).
198

See Thrower, supra note 16, at Part IV.

199

Professor Lefstein raises the concern that a judge will not permit withdrawal. Lefstein,
supra note 4, at 547; cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366
(1992) (dissent) (criticizing majority opinion mandating “noisy withdrawal” as “an artificial
construct divorced from the reality predicated by the opinion’s own hypothetical”).
200

Rubin v. State, 490 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Decker, 606 N.E.2d at 1108;
Lucas v. State, 572 S.E.2d 274 (S.C. 2002); In re Goodwin, 305 S.E.2d 578, 580 (S.C. 1983);
see Wolfram, supra note 8, at 832 (lamenting court’s divergence from principles of
professional responsibility as described in ethics rules); id. at 838 (noting some courts’
insistence that lawyer disclose client perjury or fraud regardless of privileged nature of
information).
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the court’s order and complying with the ethical proscription not to assist a witness
in presenting what [the lawyer] knows to be perjury.”201
Two South Carolina cases, decided under different ethics codes, illustrate the
judicial indifference to this legal dilemma. In the first, a Model Code case, a public
defender became aware, during the course of a criminal trial, that her client planned
to perjure himself.202 She immediately moved to withdraw.203 During an in camera
hearing to discuss her motion, the lawyer did not disclose her concerns of perjury
but, instead, explained that Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B) required her withdrawal to
avoid her violation of DR 7-102(A)(4) through the presentation of perjured
testimony.204 The judge denied her motion to withdraw and ordered the lawyer to
proceed with the trial.205 When she refused, the judge ordered her trial partner to
proceed, and he likewise refused.206 The judge held both lawyers in contempt of
court for disobeying his order to proceed207 and enjoined the county public
defender’s office from paying their salaries.208 On appeal, the South Carolina
Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge had not erred by ordering the lawyers
to proceed, nor by holding them in contempt, rationalizing that a withdrawal would
only have resulted in a continuous stream of lawyers moving, in succession, to
withdraw, thus depriving the defendant of his right to counsel.209 “Worse, new
counsel might fail to recognize the problem and unwittingly present false
evidence.”210 How an unwitting participation in perjury would be worse than a
strongly suspected participation was a question that the court did not address.
The court apparently found it preferable to force the current lawyers into
knowingly presenting false evidence than for a successor lawyer to do the same
unknowingly. The court breezily noted that “motions to withdraw must lie within
the sound discretion of the trial judge,” who “must balance the need for the orderly
administration of justice with the fact that an irreconcilable conflict exists between
counsel and the accused.”211 The lawyers simply had no choice but to comply with
court orders.212 The supreme court expressed sympathy for the defendant, the trial
judge, and any substitute counsel but had little concern for the two lawyers who had
tried to avoid participating in perjury, gamely protected their client’s confidences,

201

Lefstein, supra note 4, at 547.

202

Goodwin, 305 S.E.2d at 579.

203

Id.

204

Id.; see MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1974).

205

Goodwin, 305 S.E.2d at 579.

206

Id.

207

Id.

208

Id.

209

Id.

210

Id.

211

Id.

212

See id. at 580.
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and suffered the professional detriment of being held in contempt and sacrificing a
paycheck.213
Decided under the Model Rules’ version of the duties of confidentiality and
candor, Lucas v. State214 similarly supported a trial judge who had denied a lawyer’s
motion to withdraw to avoid presenting perjury. Turning a blind eye to the ethics
rules’ insistence on a lawyer’s withdrawal from representation of a perjurious client,
South Carolina’s high court recognized that the same possibility of a withdrawal
cycle existed under the Model Rules as had supported its decision in the Model
Code-based Goodwin contempt case twenty years before.215
Although commentators posit that withdrawal from civil cases is a smoother
drive than is withdrawal from criminal cases,216 Norris v. Lee217 demonstrates that the
grass is not always greener on the civil side of the road. In Norris, the plaintiffs’
lawyers moved to withdraw because they had come to doubt their clients’ veracity.218
The court denied their motion.219 While warning the lawyers that they could
professionally neither adduce nor argue false evidence,220 the judge told them quite
plainly to set aside their squeamishness221 and get on with their job: “I recognize that
for the young lawyer or law student, these realities sometimes make for a hard
swallow. But that is the way the law is practiced in the real world . . . .”222
In the real world, the lawyer is usually just out of luck. When the judge does not
want his show disrupted, the lawyer must swallow hard and forge ahead with his
devil’s choice, but if the lawyer chooses a path with which judge or bar counsel
disagrees, he faces a contempt citation from the judge or disciplinary charges from
bar counsel. One cryptic sentence, found at the end of Comment 7 to Model Rule
3.3, acknowledges that “even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will
be false,” the lawyer’s obligation to act in one way under the ethics rules is
subordinate to a judge’s order to act in the opposite way.223 This purported
subordination of the ethics rules has not prevented subsequent disciplinary actions or
appellate scrutiny of those lawyers’ actions through ineffective assistance of counsel

213

Id.; see also In re Decker, 606 N.E.2d 1094 (Ill. 1992) (vacating contempt citation
imposed two and one-half years earlier by trial court and affirmed by appeals court when
lawyer had tried to protect confidential client information).
214

Lucas v. State, 572 S.E.2d 274 (S.C. 2002).

215

Id. at 277.

216

See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 8, at 860-61.

217

Norris v. Lee, Civ. A. No. 93-0441, 1994 WL 143119 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 1994).

218

Id. at *1.

219

Id. at *2.

220

Id.

221

Id. at *1 (citing PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3).

222

Id. at *2.

223

MODEL RULES
Part II.A.

OF

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 7 (2002) (emphasis added); see supra
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and fair trial claims.224 Indeed, one state supreme court has expressly announced that
lawyers should invite a contempt citation from the bench as a reasonable method of
resolving this dilemma.225 Other courts have imposed the contempt sanction on
lawyers seeking to fulfill their professional obligations, even when the lawyers had
sought certiorari review and pursued every procedural avenue available to have their
ethical concerns heard.226
Why the lawyer should be the one judicial participant to have to sacrifice even an
hour of his livelihood or reputation while the judge and client insist on their
prerogatives is unclear. Dismay can be the only response to anyone who thinks it
appropriate for a lawyer to bear the burden of these poorly drafted and unresolvable
rules.227 No matter which way a lawyer turns in a possible withdrawal situation, the
ethics rules present him with a conflict. Of all the tics and conflicts in the ethics
rules, the conflict between the withdrawal rules as written and the mechanics of
withdrawal in the courtroom may be the saddest and most preventable example of
the drafters’ disconnect between reality and their expectations of proper lawyerly
conduct. Their selection of withdrawal as a “reasonable remedial measure” to avoid
or correct perjury is one of the ethics frameworks’ most notable failures—both
unreasonable and unremediative.
C. Confusion About Disclosure
The directive that a lawyer inform on his lying client in order to rectify fraud on
a court may be the single biggest producer of cognitive dissonance in the entire
ethics enterprise. Although the direct conflict between maintaining a client’s
confidences and disclosing his fraud has existed since the first written American
ethics code, lawyers have never found a way to fulfill these opposing requirements
simultaneously, and the ABA has never produced a cogent framework, or
explanation, for how they can.228

224
See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that lawyer’s
request to withdraw during bench trial led judge as fact-finder to understand that lawyer
believed the defendant was lying, depriving defendant of fair trial); Norris, 1994 WL 143119;
Lucas v. State, 572 S.E.2d 274 (S.C. 2002); In re Goodwin, 305 S.E.2d 578 (S.C. 1983); see
also supra Part II.A.
225

“‘[I]n some circumstances, . . . contempt procedures are an appropriate method by
which to test orders [that] are collateral to the principal action.’” In re Decker, 606 N.E.2d
1094, 1107 (Ill. 1992) (quoting In re Decker, 562 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)).
226

See, e.g., Rubin v. State, 490 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (denying lawyer’s
pre-voir dire motion to withdraw due to client’s insistence on perjury and held him in
contempt for refusing to continue representation of perjurer). But see Commonwealth v.
Wolfe, 447 A.2d 305, 310 n.7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (yielding to lawyer’s insistence on
withdrawing, even on pain of being cited for contempt; court noted that “there is no easy
answer to the dilemma facing a lawyer whose client wishes to offer perjured testimony”). Cf.
David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for
Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 496 (1986).
227
But see Rutherglen, supra note 4, at 278 (pronouncing that “[i]f the client does testify
falsely, the only [lawyer] likely to be disciplined would be his counsel at the time of the
testimony”).
228

See Thrower, supra note 16.
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1. The Disclosure Rules Conflict with Each Other
The 1908 Canon of Professional Ethics 37 required a lawyer to “preserve his
client’s confidences,” while Canon 29 required the lawyer to reveal perjury to
authorities, and Canon 41 required him to disclose that his client has committed
fraud or deception.229 In 1953, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility attempted to resolve this conflict and concluded that the
lawyer’s duty of confidentiality overrode his duty to reveal fraud or deception and
his duty to disclose perjury.230 Formal Opinion 287, interpreting Canons 29, 37, and
41, stood for the proposition that a lawyer must not disclose his client’s perjury from
either a civil case that has been completed or a criminal trial in progress, but he must
withdraw from the representation.231 While the opinion did choose one ethical
principle over another, like all ABA opinions, 287 carried no precedential weight in
a disciplinary hearing, so it could provide no cover for the lawyer accused of
violating one rule in the service of the other.232
Sixteen years after the appearance of Opinion 287, the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 7-102 forbade a lawyer from
“[k]nowingly [using] perjured testimony or false evidence.”233 In the same vein,
when the lawyer had information that “clearly established” that the client had
perpetrated a fraud on the court during the course of the representation—this
presumably included perjury—the lawyer was mandated to “reveal the fraud to the
affected person or tribunal” if the client would not.234 Conversely, Disciplinary Rule
4-101 required a lawyer to maintain his client’s confidences and secrets.235 So
despite Formal Opinion 287’s choice of confidentiality over honesty, the lawyer’s
Code-mandated obligation remained servant to two masters—confidentiality and
honesty—each of which demanded sole fealty.
For five years, lawyers in Model Code states labored under this impossible
situation, until the ABA amended DR 7-102 to exempt from a lawyer’s disclosure
duty any information that was protected as a “privileged communication.”236 What
does “privileged communication” include? DR 7-102 gave no definition and no
examples of the term. DR 4-101 on confidentiality defines “confidence” as falling

229
Canon 37 required a lawyer to “preserve his client’s confidences,” while Canon 29
required a lawyer to reveal perjury to authorities, and Canon 41 required a lawyer to turn in
his client for fraud or deception. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canons 29, 37, & 41 (1908)
(Canon 37 amended 1937).
230

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 287 (1953).

231

Id. “If the client will not [disclose his perjury to the court], the lawyer should have
nothing further to do with him.” Id.
232

As documents that construe a model, not mandatory ethics code, the ethics opinions do
not bind any other body as precedent.
233

MODEL CODE
(emphasis added).

OF

PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1969) (amended 1974)

234

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969) (amended 1974).

235

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1969) (amended 1974).

236

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1974).
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within the attorney-client privilege;237 perhaps the drafters of the 1974 amendment
meant for DR 7-102 to capture “confidences,” but not secrets. Without a standard
written into the rule, lawyers were on their own in navigating. Why the drafters did
not use “confidence” or “confidence or secret,” rather than “privileged
communication,” in Disciplinary Rule 7 is anyone’s guess. The context of the rules
provides no clue. The bottom line, by 1974, was that the Model Code gave lawyers
three levels of information about which they had to keep quiet at different times:
confidences, secrets, and privileged communications. Only two of those terms came
with definitions, leaving lawyers in the dark about what the 1974 amendment
required of them.238
Pressed into action by the deficiencies of the Code, the ABA Standing
Committee issued Opinion 341 considering the meaning and reach of the 1974
amendment to the disclosure rule. It characterizes the amended disciplinary rule as
“reinstat[ing] the essence of Opinion 287,” making it “unthinkable . . . that a lawyer
should be subject to disciplinary action for failing to reveal information [that] by law
is not to be revealed without the consent of the client,”239 and proclaiming that “the
lawyer is not now in that untenable position.”240 Opinion 341 concludes that the
term “privileged communication” in DR 7-102 includes both confidences and secrets
protected by DR 4-101241—all confidential information gained in the course of the
professional relationship.242
Unfortunately, the Committee did not leave well enough alone. It continued its
exposition on the importance of confidentiality, stating that “it is clear that there has
long been an accommodation in favor of preserving confidences either through
practice or interpretation. . . . The tradition [of preserving confidences] . . . should
take precedence, in all but the most serious cases, over the duty [of disclosure of
perjury].”243 This dicta, likely included for emphasis but with no thought for impact,
would leave unanswered the relevant question in every instance when confidentiality

237

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1969) (amended 1974). The
attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence that a lawyer or client must invoke in response to
a question by counsel or judge. The privilege can be overcome with an exception for crime or
fraud. See also Fried, supra note 226, at 468-69.
238

See Rutherglen, supra note 4, at 272-73.

239

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).

240

Id. Opinion 287 involved a client, represented by counsel, who had committed perjury
during his divorce action and later informed the lawyer about the lie while they were
consulting over support payments. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal
Op. 287 (1953); see also Gilda M. Tuoni, Society Versus the Lawyers: The Strange Hierarchy
of Protections of the “New” Client Confidentiality, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 439,
484-86 (1993).
241

ABA, Formal Op. 341; see Appel, supra note 71, at 1920-21.

242

See Rutherglen, supra note 4, at 271; cf. ABA, Formal Op. 341 (providing reasons
against using attorney-client privilege to define scope of DR 7-102(B)).
243

ABA, Formal Op. 341.
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clashes with honesty: what, precisely, would be the “most serious cases” in which
the confidential information must take a backseat to disclosure?244
Another conflict between the rules relates to past fraud and future fraud.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102 limits its reach to already-committed perjury or fraud: the
rule states that a lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that his client
“perpetrated” a fraud in or out of court shall take action, including disclosure, except
when the information is protected as privileged.245 On the other hand, DR 4-101
permits a lawyer to reveal his client’s intention “to commit a [future] crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime.”246 One rule mandates the disclosure,
while the other permits it. The rules did not explain why past fraud was subject to
mandatory disclosure but present and future frauds were not. But one thing seemed
clear after the 1974 amendment and the 1975 Opinion 341: the attorney-client
privilege protected from revelation any communication made by a client to his
lawyer regarding past criminal activity, even if that activity had happened during an
interaction with law enforcement or court personnel.247 Indeed, if a client told a
lawyer about his fraud committed before the representation began, the lawyer
certainly would think that Disciplinary Rule 4-101 obligated him to keep that
information confidential and not disclose it under pain of discipline.248 Tell that to
Camelia Casby.
In State v. Casby,249 a criminal action against a lawyer for attorney misconduct,
the police arrested a Peter Spedevick on vehicle offenses.250 Peter falsely identified
himself to the arresting officer as Ben Spedevick, Peter’s brother.251 Peter called his
lawyer, Ms. Casby, from jail. Lawyer Casby had previously done legal work for
Peter.252 She arranged for his release from jail, signing papers identifying him and
signed by him as Ben Spedevick.253 She drove Peter home, told him what her bill
would be, and considered her services ended.254
“Peter, as Ben, appeared in court alone for his arraignment.”255 Later, before his
pre-trial hearing, he called Lawyer Casby for advice in negotiating a plea.256 The
244
In the years that followed, with no way to pin down those “most serious cases,” courts
increasingly adopted the crime-fraud exception to the evidentiary attorney-client privilege as
the measure of the lawyer’s duty to reveal client fraud. See Fried, supra note 226, at 494.
245

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1974).

246

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1974).

247

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).

248

DR 7-102 states that the client must perpetrate the fraud “in the course of the
representation.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1974).
249

State v. Casby, 348 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1984).

250

Id. at 737.

251

Id.

252

Id.

253

Id. at 737-38.

254

Id. at 738.

255

Id.

256

Id.
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lawyer called the prosecutor about the “Spedevick case,” though at the trial, the
secretary’s message slip read “Ben Spedevick.”257 Later that day, the lawyer
negotiated a disposition.258 Her confirming letter to the prosecutor referred to her
client as “Mr. Spedevick.”259 Using the letter, Peter handled the pre-trial hearing
alone, pled guilty as “Ben,” and received fines for his offenses.260
The lawyer was later prosecuted under a misdemeanor statute for attorney
misconduct in deceiving a court.261 At her trial, she claimed that she did not learn
until over a week after the pre-trial hearing that Peter even had a brother named
Ben.262 The Minnesota Supreme Court found sufficient evidence that she had had
actual knowledge of Peter’s use of Ben’s name by the time she arranged the
disposition with the prosecutor.263 Further, the court rejected her argument that even
if she had been part of Peter’s deceit, both the attorney-client privilege and the code
of professional ethics precluded her from disclosing Peter’s true identity.264 It
likewise rejected the lawyer’s argument that her client’s fraud was a past act by the
time she discovered it, so it received no protection under either ethics or evidence
code.265 It reasoned that, not only was Peter’s activity a continuing, not a past,
deceit, but the lawyer also did not receive the information about his identity through
her work for him, so the attorney-client privilege did not cover her knowledge.266
The Minnesota court felt in no way bound by the ABA Ethics Committee’s
pronouncement that a lawyer’s discipline for maintaining her client’s confidence was
“unthinkable.”267 Quite to the contrary, Ms. Casby was placed in exactly that
“untenable position”268 and was convicted.269
Part of the problem with the confidence/disclosure conundrum is that lawyers
receive almost no information from avenues other than the representation of their
clients, so in reality, the confidentiality rule covers very little information that would
not be subject to apparent protection. By the time the ABA revised the Model Code
into the Model Rules, its high value for a lawyer’s confidence-keeping, expressed in
257

Id. The opinion did not comment on this opposing evidence nor consider the possibility
that the secretary had inaccurately inferred one fact in the absence of other facts.
258

Id.

259

Id.

260

Id.

261

Id. at 737. Later that year, the Supreme Court of Minnesota formally entered
disciplinary judgment against Casby, with a public reprimand and a two-year probation. In re
Casby, 355 N.W.2d 704, 705 (Minn. 1984).
262

Casby, 348 N.W.2d at 738.

263

Id.

264

Id. at 739.

265

Id.

266

Id.

267

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).

268

Cf. id.

269

Casby, 348 N.W.2d at 739.
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Opinions 287 and 341, had given way to a growing insistence on honesty to a court
at all costs; hence, Model Rule 3.3 requires a lawyer who has offered any sort of
material false evidence to a court to take reasonable remedial measures to correct the
court’s false impression, including disclosure of confidential information.270
The ABA backed up its new-found urgency for honesty with Formal Opinions
87-353 and 93-376. Opinion 87-353 characterizes Rule 3.3 as a “major policy
change with regard to the lawyer’s duty” in the face of perjury.271 It advises lawyers
to disclose the perjury if it has happened before the “conclusion of the proceeding”272
and if other remedial measures have been ineffective in rectifying the fraud.273
Opinion 93-376 extends a lawyer’s disclosure duty to perjury that occurs pre-trial on
the theory that even though perjured discovery may not become evidence at trial, its
“potential” as evidence triggers the lawyer’s duty to take measures under the rule,
“including disclosure if necessary.”274 With these opinions, the ABA was walking
closer and closer to the line of insisting on complete truth in court to the detriment of
client confidentiality, and yet, it never has just bravely crossed over that line and
come down squarely on the side on which it so obviously wants to be.
2. Disclosure and Withdrawal Form a Deathlock
When is disclosure “necessary” to rectify a client’s perjury? Apparently, it is
always necessary if the lawyer has not succeeded in slipping away from his client
before the perjury occurs. Of course, the rules make this anything but clear. The
comments to Model Rule 3.3 imply that if withdrawal will remedy the problem, a
lawyer can avoid disclosing his client’s confidences in the service of correcting the
record.275 But the ABA Ethics Committee concluded as early as 1987 that
“withdrawal can rarely serve as a remedy for the client’s perjury.”276 Relying on
Informal Opinion 1314, the Committee writing Opinion 87-353 drew this
distinction: when the lawyer has notice that the client will perjure himself and can
withdraw before submission of the perjury, the withdrawal is sufficient to fix the
problem, and disclosure is not necessary. On the other hand, if the lawyer is

270
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) & (b) (1983) (amended 2002); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) & (b) (2002).
271

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987). Professor
Lefstein argues that Opinion 87-353 “conflicts with generally accepted principles of
professional responsibility.” Lefstein, supra note 4, at 536.
272
ABA, Formal Op. 87-353; see MODEL RULES
(amended 2002).

OF

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (1983)

273

ABA, Formal Op. 87-353.

274

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-376 (1993).

275

“[T]he advocate should seek to withdraw if that will remedy the situation. If . . . not . . .
the advocate should make disclosure to the court.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3
cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002). “If withdrawal . . . [fails], the advocate must make such
disclosure . . . as is reasonably necessary . . . .” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3
cmt. 10 (2002).
276

ABA, Formal Op. 87-353 n.7.
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surprised by the perjury, or if the client insists on perjuring himself when he gets on
the witness stand, the lawyer must disclose the perjury or the intention.277
Five years later, Formal Opinion 92-366 showed how far the Committee was
willing to torture the language of the Model Rules to force both disclosure and
withdrawal on a lawyer in the service of avoiding fraud—and not only fraud in court,
which had hitherto been the Committee’s greatest concern.278 And then Opinion 98412 re-affirmed the withdrawal-before-perjury treatment as the only way to avoid the
bitter medicine of disclosure: if the perjury happens during the representation, then
the lawyer must disclose the perjury. According to this opinion, disclosure is not
necessary if the lawyer can accomplish his withdrawal before the client makes false
statements to the court. Once the lawyer has offered material false evidence,
withdrawal “may” be insufficient to undo the harm caused by the perjury.279 All of
this advice utterly conflicts with 1983’s Rule 3.3, which applies when the lawyer
“has” already “offered” material false evidence.280 This “Quick—withdraw before
he lies!” advice appears to be the Ethics Committee prescribing what it wishes were
the rules, rather than interpreting the actual rules’ language—just as the dissenters
from Opinion 92-366 charged in another context on withdrawal.281
As it happened, the Rules did catch up with the opinions. With the 2002 revision
of Model Rule 3.3, the distinction between past fraud and future fraud became a
mere memory: whether the lawyer knows that the client has already offered material
false evidence or is planning on it, the lawyer is required to take reasonable remedial
measures, including disclosure of the perjury, “if necessary.”282
Emboldened by the ABA’s insistence on honesty at all costs, some states have
gone even farther than the ABA in creating ethics environments in which lawyers are
responsible for following rules that cannot be satisfied. New Jersey provides one
example. Its expanded version of Rule 3.3 required disclosure by a lawyer of all
material confidential information that might “tend to” mislead a court.283 The thenVice President of the New Jersey State Bar Association accused the rule of
“essentially destroy[ing] whatever confidentiality exists between lawyer and

277
See id. (construing ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314
(1975)).
278

See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992). The
dissent criticized the majority’s “linguistic prestidigitation” in its efforts to reach what it
considered to be a desirable, but unauthorized, result. Id. (dissent).
279

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-412 (1998).

280

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (1983) (amended 2002).

281

See ABA, Formal Op. 92-366 (dissent).

This opinion attempts to reach a result considered desirable, while at the same time
according deference to the text of the Rules [that] serve as our road map. We think
the effort founders on the shoals of the English language as employed in the Rules and
as understood when given its common and ordinary meaning.
Id.
282

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) & (b) (2002).

283

N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(5) (1997); see Walfish, supra note 24, at 638.
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client.”284 He also opined that every trial lawyer in New Jersey grossly violated the
rule “because no lawyer can represent a client and comply with that rule.”285 Even
after the bar expressed deep concern and New Jersey amended its standard to require
disclosure if an omission is “reasonably certain to mislead” a court,286 the state had
disciplined twenty-three lawyers for falling short of compliance with the rule.287 The
wonder here is that the number of discipline cases was not higher. While the state
changed its rule ostensibly to make interpretation and compliance less difficult, the
change from “tend to” mislead to “reasonably certain to mislead” is semantic only
and obviously—from the number of discipline cases—not one that lawyers could
understand and fulfill.
Despite the fact that Rule 3.3 characterizes disclosure as a last resort, because
withdrawal is so rarely permitted to practicing lawyers, the rule, as applied, almost
always requires disclosure of client confidences to remedy fraud on a court. But
instead of just writing a rule that says so, the drafters refuse to make that choice and
instead force lawyers to agonize over whether to disclose perjury and subject their
clients to all manner of bad results, or to maintain their confidentiality and suffer
professional opprobrium. If the ABA privileges truth to a court above every other
consideration—and there can be no doubt now that it does—then it should simply
say so in its rules and launch a new era in lawyer regulation.
III. CONCLUSION
Withdrawal from representation and disclosure of client confidences are
inherently unworkable concepts if the ABA’s goal is the prevention of a court’s
action on misleading information. Comparably, the client’s narration of his story
while the lawyer silently sits by is the ultimate white flag of the ABA drafters, their
final, tacit admission that no lawyer can prevent perjury. Unfortunately, none of the
drafters seems cognizant of the fact—or willing to admit—that no lawyer can fix it
without violating other principles of legal representation. The reasonable remedial
measures might be workable if the candor rule existed in a vacuum, without the
conflicting rules of client confidentiality, zealous representation, and the Sixth
Amendment. When layered with these other principles, and when distinguished
from what goes on in real courtrooms with real judges, these measures can claim no
higher ground than a safe harbor,288 a checklist for a lawyer seeking protection from
an ethics prosecution. But even on that score, they fail.289 They are neither
reasonable nor remedial.
284

See Walfish, supra note 24, at 641-42.

285

See id. at 642.

286

Id. at 639.

287

Id. at 645.

288

See Dodge, supra note 11, at 35-36 (suggesting safe harbor from discipline consisting of
steps of remediation for both civil and criminal cases).
289
Even as lawyers try to work their way through the reasonable remedial measures, they
may need to mind the order in which they progress through them—not that the rules
themselves mention any such need. For example, some courts that have adopted the narrative
solution to perjury may require the lawyer to seek to withdraw from representation before
employing narration. Cf. Crystal, supra note 4, at 1547-48.
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If the ABA is serious about providing lawyers with a set of rules capable of
satisfaction—as opposed to what it has now, which is a series of increasingly
unreachable imperatives—it will start over with one goal in mind. It will, after one
hundred years, choose whether the more important goal is client confidentiality or
candor to the court, and it will re-write the rules so that all mandates on lawyerly
behavior point toward and can satisfy that one goal. For example, Model Rule 3.3
would work if courts and bar counsel would permit lawyers to disclose perjury
without subsequent discipline for violating confidentiality. In addition, or possibly
instead, removing the various levels of knowledge that a lawyer must meet before
being qualified to reveal confidences could fix the problem. The ABA has refused to
choose and has, instead, saddled lawyers with multiple conflicting goals and left it to
them to sort out the mess. The multiple competing goals have produced a failed
regulatory state. The ABA should exercise leadership by starting over, from the
ground up, and draft a brand new version of rules. The ABA should lead, rather than
placing the burden of clairvoyance and interpretation on others. Lawyers—not to
mention judges and clients—simply deserve better.
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